As an experimental supplement (and participatory gift) at the end of my ongoing household survey, I give women participants an opportunity to pick a gift. Before they choose, though, they are given the opportunity to consult with their husbands about the gift (note that 'consult' seems generous here because when men are involved, there is rarely discussion, the men simply pick the prize). Because the surveys are conducted privately we have attained a degree of momentary asymmetric information about the gift, in other words, for the moment, she knows about the prize while he does not. Additionally, the gifts are moderately gendered. According to our focus groups, coffee is valued by men and kangas (patterned cloth, which although it has many household uses, is often worn as a skirt) are valued by women.
This experiment will be informative in the larger analysis of uptake in concealable contraception and bargaining over fertility, but it also allows for some analysis on the baseline data about bargaining over financial decisions. Because of this, I stumbled upon a very cool paper by Nava Ashraf (2009) for empirical evidence on the bargaining framework in the presence of asymmetric information.
She concludes that, when given the opportunity in a savings experiment, an individual who does not control the family's finances chooses to privately deposit money into their own account (as opposed to the joint account) when their partner is unaware of the gift. However, an interesting feature of this context is that, in the Philippines, women are the financial managers of most households. Because of this, men are much more likely to covertly deposit the money into their own account, rather than share it with their spouse in the joint household account. This stands in contrast to the gender roles (based on preliminary data) in Tanzania, where women report that their husbands are in control of household financial decisions. So while there are many factors making my experiment different (e.g. the gift is smaller in value and could be turned over to spouse after our departure), it will be fun to examine the correlation between women who consult with their husband and household financial decision-making.
This experiment will be informative in the larger analysis of uptake in concealable contraception and bargaining over fertility, but it also allows for some analysis on the baseline data about bargaining over financial decisions. Because of this, I stumbled upon a very cool paper by Nava Ashraf (2009) for empirical evidence on the bargaining framework in the presence of asymmetric information.
She concludes that, when given the opportunity in a savings experiment, an individual who does not control the family's finances chooses to privately deposit money into their own account (as opposed to the joint account) when their partner is unaware of the gift. However, an interesting feature of this context is that, in the Philippines, women are the financial managers of most households. Because of this, men are much more likely to covertly deposit the money into their own account, rather than share it with their spouse in the joint household account. This stands in contrast to the gender roles (based on preliminary data) in Tanzania, where women report that their husbands are in control of household financial decisions. So while there are many factors making my experiment different (e.g. the gift is smaller in value and could be turned over to spouse after our departure), it will be fun to examine the correlation between women who consult with their husband and household financial decision-making.